

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 252295  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 252295

STADIS////////////////////

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN 3820 ACTION SECSTATE OCT 15.

QUOTE: S E C R E T USUN 3820

LIMDIS

FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE AND IO DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY HELMAN IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, UN, RH

SUBJECT: MOOSE/PREM CHAND CONVERSATION

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED DRAFT TEXT OF MOOSE/PREM CHAND MEETING:

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QUOTE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE AND UN  
REPRESENTATIVE PREM CHAND

DATE: OCTOBER 13, 1977

PLACE: USUN

PARTICIPANTS: RICHARD MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
LOUIS JANOWSKI, AF LIASON TO USUN (NOTETAKER)  
GENERAL PREM CHAND - UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
JAMES JONAH - UN SECRETARIAT; ACTING AID TO PREM CHAND

PREM CHAND BEGAN THE MEETING BY STATING THAT HE HAD MET  
WITH AMBASSADORS YOUNG AND MCHENRY THE PREVIOUS DAY AND FOUND  
THEIR VIEWS HELPFUL.

MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN ON TWO TRIPS TO AFRICA  
WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG WHO HAD A GOOD FEEL FOR THE PLAYERS.  
MR. MOOSE STATED HE HAD REVIEWED THE SUMMARY OF YESTERDAY'S  
MEETING, AND WISHED TO AQUAINT PREM CHAND WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE  
FRAMEWORK OF HIS MISSION. THESE VIEWS WERE BASED ON CONVERSTATIONS  
WITH BOTH SECRETARY VANCE AND THE PRESIDENT. MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT  
HE RESPECTED PREM CHAND'S POSITION AS A UN REPRESENTATIVE, BUT  
STILL THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO COMMENT ON HOW THE US SAW HIS ROLE.  
THE US AS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE RHODESIAN INITIATIVE ALWAYS RISKED  
VIEWING THE MISSION AS PART OF OUR INITIATIVE. YOU, HOEVER,  
SEE IT AS MORE FINITE AND YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES ARE TO THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL. LORD CARVER'S ROLE IS NOT EXACTLY  
COTERMINOUS WITH YOURS AND IS SOMEWHAT BROADER.

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MR. MOOSE STATED THAT DON MCHENRY HAD SPOKEN OF TWO PHASES--  
NAMELY FINDING ACCEPTABLE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS AND GETTING RID  
OF SMITH. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THEM SEPARATE. MANY, BUT  
NOT ALL OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AS WELL AS SOME OF THE NATION-  
ALISTS MIXED THESE TWO CONCEPTS, WHICH MADE THINGS DIFFICULT.

WE BELIEVE WORKING OUT VIABLE, FAIR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS  
ARE A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OUR ABILITY TO SEE THAT SMITH  
DEPARTS. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS ARE A PRECONDITION TO "BELLING THE  
CAT." FAIR AND WORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS AND THE  
TRANSITION ARE ESSENTIAL FOR US SUPPORT AND EVEN MORE SO FOR  
UK SUPPORT. PRESIDENT CARTER FEELS THAT IF FAIR AND EQUITABLE  
ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT AND IF THE AFRICANS, PARTICULARLY  
THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, AGREE, THEN THE INFLUENCE OF THE US  
CAN BE PLACED BEHIND MEASURES TO REMOVE SMITH. IF THIS CANNOT  
BE ACCOMPLISHED THE US WILL HAVE REAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS. WE  
NEED FAIR AND OPEN ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA.

WE BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE IMPORTANT ASPECTS TO MILITARY  
ARRANGEMENTS. THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE WORKABLE, IMPARTIAL  
AND EQUITABLE.

WE HOPE YOUR MISSION WILL HELP BUILD CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY WITH THE RHODESIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS. THEY ARE PROFESSIONALS, AND MANY BELIEVE THE CAUSE THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR IS A LOSING ONE. THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE THEIR MEN KILLED AND THE MOMENT MIGHT COME WHEN THEY WILL GO TO SMITH AND FACE HIM WITH THE FACTS. IF IN ADDITION YOU SUCCEED IN GAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE LIBERATION COMMANDERS, THEN SMITH WILL HAVE FEW OPTIONS. WE REALIZE IT IS NOT YOUR JOB TO NEGOTIATE SMITH OUT, BUT IF YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL IN YOUR TASK, THEN WE WILL BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOVE. IN EFFECT, THE TASK WILL BE MANAGEABLE.

WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUGABE. IF THEY SPLIT, CIVIL WAR COULD RESULT. ONE OF  
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YOUR STRONGEST ASSETS WILL BE THE ATTITUDES OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. THEY ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AND WANT TO ASSURE THAT THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE WAR ENDS DOES NOT RESULT IN CIVIL WAR AND PRESERVES STABILITY IN THE AREA. IF INDEPENDENCE COMES BY WAR, CIVIL WAR COULD RESULT. CONVERSELY, IF THERE IS AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT THE PRESENT STRUGGLE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE. THE PRESIDENTS DON'T WANT EITHER; THEY HAVE MUCH TO LOSE. THERE ALREADY IS A DANGER--A DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE INTEREST OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. OBASANJO HAS ALSO OFFERED STRONG SUPPORT AND WE URGE CONTINUAL CONSULTATION WITH HIM AT VARIOUS STAGES.

PREM CHAND STATED HE WOULD KEEP OUR VIEWS IN MIND. OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN HIS UN ROLE AND THE UK/US INITIATIVE. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE THE QUESTIONS OF REMOVING SMITH AND THAT OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.

HE WISHED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE QUESTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE, PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THE AFRICANS PERCEIVED THEY WERE GETTING; THEY WERE GETTING ADAMANT. HE WANTED...  
TO DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER MATTERS WITH LORD CARVER.

MR. JONAH ASKED IF THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY FELL INTO THE CATEGORY OF A FAIR AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION.

MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT NEYERERE AND OTHERS HAD WANTED A GUARANTEE THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMY BE DISBANDED. WE HAD FINALLY STRUCK THE BARGAIN THAT THE FUTURE ARMY WOULD BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS FOUND THIS ACCEPTABLE. THE EQUITY IN THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IF  
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THE WAR WAS FOUGHT TO A CONCLUSION, THE ONLY FORCES REMAINING WOULD BE THE LIBERATION FORCES. WE SHOULDN'T TALK IN TERMS OF DISMANTLING THE RHODESIAN FORCES. SMITH HAS AGREED THAT THE SELOUS SCOUTS WILL GO, THE MERCENARIES WILL LEAVE ON THEIR OWN AND THE MILITIA WILL GO HOME. THAT ONLY LEAVES THE HARD CORE OF THE ARMY, A MANAGEABLE NUMBER.

PREM CHAND NOTED THAT WE WOULD ONLY KNOW THE ANSWERS AFTER TAKING WITH SMITH.

DICK MOOSE STATED HE ALSO WANTED TO TALK WITH BOTSWANNAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOGWE TO FURTHER EXPLORE THE CONCEPT OF A "THIRD FORCE." IN LUSAKA, PRESIDENT MACHEL TALKED OF THE NEED FOR TWO NEUTRAL FORCES. THE UN WAS OBVIOUSLY ONE AND THE OTHER SEEMED TO BE A PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCE THAT BELONGED TO NEITHER NKOMO OR MUGABE. SUCH A FORCE DOESN'T EXIST, BUT COULD EXIST. PERHAPS IT COULD BE IN PLACE AT THE OUTSET OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD. SOME OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS MAY HAVE THIS IN MIND EVEN THOUGH NKOMO WON'T LIKE IT.

PREM CHAND NOTED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD TAKE A TOUGH LINE. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE.

MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT A PROBLEM DID EXIST VIS A VIS THE POLICE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY HAD AN ANTI-TERRORIST ROLE.

PREM CHAND NOTED THAT THE ARMY WAS NOT THAT SERIOUS A PROBLEM. WITH A CEASEFIRE, UN FORCE, AND WESTERN GUARANTEES, THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF EXTERNAL AGRESSION. PERHAPS BOTSWANNAN, ZAMBIAN AND MOZAMBIQUAN ELEMENTS INTEGRATED INTO THE POLICE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY. HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A FURTHER LOOK.

MR. MOOSE ASKED FOR PREM CHAND'S IMMEDIATE PLANS.

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PREM CHAND STATED HE WOULD BE IN LONDON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH LORD CARVER FROM SATURDAY TO WEDNESDAY. HE WOULD THEN RETURN TO NEW YORK TO REPORT TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM. HE WOULD THEN LIKELY PROCEED TO MEET WITH THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS. HE WOULD MAKE NO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL HE HAD FINISHED HIS CONSULTATIONS. HE WAS APPROACHING PROBLEM FROM THE OUTSIDE IN.

MR. MOOSE INDICATED THAT WE AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH AND,  
DESPITE THE VIEWS OF SOME, WERE NOT BACKING ANY CANDIDATE IN  
RHODESIA. WE COULD LIVE WITH NKOMO.

PREM CHAND NOTED THAT SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE BACKING  
NKOMO IF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION WAS ANY EXAMPLE.  
THE SOVIETS HAD GONE BEYOND THE STAND OF THE FRONT LINE  
PRESIDENTS IN BACKING NKOMO. END

UNQUOT YOUNG  
UNQUOTE VANCE

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NNN

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